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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but 
also to have certain attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions), and this despite the fact 
that we rarely, if ever, have direct voluntary control over our attitudes. Moreover, I argue that 
whatever obligations we have with respect to our actions derive from our obligations with respect 
to our attitudes. More specifically, I argue that an agent is obligated to perform an action if and 
only if it’s the action that she would perform if she were to have the attitudes that she is required 
to have. This view, which I call attitudism, has three important implications. First, it implies that 
an adequate practical theory must not be exclusively act-orientated. That is, it must require more 
from us than just the performance of certain voluntary acts. Second, it implies that an adequate 
practical theory must be attitude-dependent. That is, it must hold that what we ought to do de-
pends on what attitudes we ought to have. Third, it implies that no adequate practical theory can 
require us to perform acts that we would not perform even if we were to have the attitudes that 
we are required to have. I then show how these implications can help us both to address certain 
puzzling cases of rational choice and to understand why most typical practical theories (utilitari-
anism, virtue ethics, rational egoism, Rossian deontology, etc.) are mistaken.   
 
It seems that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but also to have and 
to form certain attitudes. After all, we make claims such as: (i) you should feel ashamed of 
yourself; (ii) Christians are obliged to love their enemies; (iii) there is nothing wrong with 
wanting to win; (iv) you should be proud of what you’ve accomplished; (v) it’s wrong to 
hate people because of their race; and (vi) given all the scientific evidence to the contrary, 
you shouldn’t believe that humans and dinosaurs ever coexisted. Of course, some will ob-
ject that we can’t be obligated to ϕ unless our ϕ-ing is under our voluntary control and 
that, unlike actions, attitudes are not under our voluntary control. We cannot, for in-
stance, form a belief at will. No matter how much I want to believe that I have an immor-
tal soul, I cannot, given the lack of evidence, bring myself to believe this—at least, not by 
willing myself to believe it.  
I’ll address this objection shortly. But, for now, note that, by ‘attitudes’, I mean to refer 
to all and only those mental states that are responsive to a rational subject’s awareness of 
reason-constituting facts.1 Such mental states include intentions, propositional attitudes 
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such as beliefs and desires, as well as certain emotions, such as hope, fear, admiration, 
contempt, guilt, and indignation. These are mental states that a rational subject will tend 
to have, or tend not to have, in response to reasons (or apparent reasons)—facts (or what 
are taken to be facts) that count for or against the attitudes in question. For instance, a 
rational subject will tend to believe that it will rain today in response to her awareness of a 
fact that constitutes conclusive reason for her having this belief, such as the fact that a re-
liable weather service has predicted that it will rain today. This conception of ‘attitudes’ 
includes many mental states, but excludes feelings of hunger, nausea, and dizziness, which 
are not responsive to a subject’s awareness of reason-constituting facts. Suppose, for in-
stance, that I have too quickly consumed a good-sized meal and am still feeling hungry, as 
there has not yet been sufficient time for brain to receive the relevant physiological signals 
from my stomach. Even if I am aware that I’ve eaten more than enough to be satiated, my 
hunger is not responsive to this awareness. Instead, it is responsive only to the physiologi-
cal signals that supposedly take about twenty minutes to travel from the stomach to the 
brain. So it is only those mental states that are responsive to reasons that count as atti-
tudes. And this is important, because insofar as we think that our obligations are a func-
tion of our reasons, the fact that our attitudes, as much as our actions, are responsive to 
reasons would suggest that we can have obligations with respect to them as well. 
Presuming that I’m right about our having obligations with respect to both acts and 
attitudes, this raises the question of what, if any, relationship there is between the two. 
That is, what is the relationship between the acts that we ought to perform and the atti-
tudes that we ought to have? One possibility, the acts-first view, is that the attitudes that 
we ought to have are a function of the acts that we ought to perform. Perhaps, we ought to 
have the attitudes that would lead us to perform the acts that we ought to perform. An-
other possibility, the neither-first view, is that the two are completely unrelated or that 
each is a function of some third thing, such as how we ought to be. Suppose, for instance, 
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1 What I’m calling attitudes is similar to what Scanlon calls judgment-sensitive attitudes: that is, attitudes that are sen-
sitive to our judgments about reasons (1998, p. 20). But, like Parfit, I think that we can respond to reasons without hav-
ing any judgments about what our reasons are. For, as Parfit notes, “we respond to reasons when we are aware of facts 
that give us these reasons, and this awareness leads us to believe, or want, or do what these facts give us reasons to be-
lieve, or want, or do” (2011, p. 493). Thus, we can respond to reasons without knowing that this is what we are doing 
(2011, p. 461).  
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that we ought to be virtuous. On one version of the neither-first view, then, we ought to 
have the attitudes and perform the acts that a virtuous person would have and perform. 
The third and final possibility, the attitudes-first view, is that the acts that we ought to per-
form are a function of the attitudes that we ought to have. I’ll argue for this third possibil-
ity. Specifically, I’ll argue for a particular version of the attitudes-first view, which I’ll call 
attitudism. 
The basic idea underlying attitudism is quite simple. An agent’s obligation to perform 
an action derives from a more fundamental obligation to refrain from having an imper-
missible set of attitudes. Specifically, attitudism holds that an agent is obligated to perform 
an act ϕ if and only if, and because, she would ϕ provided she were to have some permis-
sible set of attitudes. To illustrate, suppose that Kwame, a middle-aged man with heart 
disease, is currently experiencing severe chest pain and is obligated to have the following 
set of attitudes: (1) the belief that taking a nitroglycerin pill is necessary to prevent himself 
from dying of a heart attack (because, we’ll assume, he possesses conclusive evidence for 
this belief), (2) the desire not to die of a heart attack (because, we’ll assume, it would be 
desirable for him to survive), and (3) the intention to take a nitroglycerin pill (because 
performing this action would produce what’s desirable). Further suppose that if he were 
to have these attitudes, he would take a nitroglycerin pill, for he has several such pills on 
hand for exactly this sort of situation. Attitudism implies, then, that he has a fundamental 
obligation to have attitudes 1–3 and a derivative obligation to take a nitroglycerin pill, for 
this is the act that he would perform if he were to have the attitudes that he is required to 
have.   
So that’s the basic idea. More formally, though, the view is as follows. 
 
Attitudism: For any rational subject S, any act ϕ, any two consecutive times t1 and t2, 
and any later time tn (2 < n), S’s ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, obligatory if and only if, and be-
cause, every set of attitudes that S is, as of t1, permitted to have at t2 has a 100% objec-
tive chance of resulting in S’s intentionally ϕ-ing at tn.2 
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 2 From this, we can derive the following accounts of permissibility and impermissibility. S’s ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, 
permissible if and only if, and because, there is some set of attitudes that S is, as of t1, permitted to have at t2 that has 
some objective chance of resulting in S’s intentionally ϕ-ing at tn. S’s ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, impermissible if and only if, 
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Before I attempt to defend attitudism, I need to clarify a few things about it. First, by 
‘a rational subject’, I mean any subject who is responsive to both reasons and normative 
requirements. Such a subject will, to the extent that she approximates ideal rationality, 
have the following tendencies: (1) to ϕ when she’s aware of facts that constitute decisive 
reasons for ϕ-ing, (2) to refrain from ϕ-ing unless she’s aware of facts that constitute suffi-
cient reasons for ϕ-ing, and (3) to abide by normative requirements. The need for 3 in ad-
dition to both 1 and 2 arises given that there are situations in which a subject has sufficient 
reasons for each of two or more attitudes but is prohibited by some normative require-
ment from having them jointly (Broome 1999). Take, for instance, the normative require-
ment against intending to ϕ while believing that you will not ϕ.3 And imagine that you 
have both sufficient reason to intend to go out to a bar with friends and sufficient reason 
to intend to stay home curled up with a good book, for assume that each would be equally 
rewarding. But now suppose that you believe that you will not go out, as you’ve already 
changed into your pajamas and plopped down on the couch. It is, then, impermissible for 
you to intend to go out so long as you maintain this belief. Yet each attitude is individually 
permissible. You are permitted to intend to go out, and you are permitted to believe that 
you will not go out. You’re just not permitted to have both attitudes simultaneously. Thus, 
you can be prohibited from having a certain set of attitudes not only because you lack 
sufficient reason for one or more of the attitudes contained in that set, but also because 
the set itself violates some normative requirement. And this explains the need to talk 
about normative requirements in addition to whether or not there is sufficient reason to 
have or to lack the attitudes in question. 
Second, the relevant notion of chance is the objective one—the one that doesn’t de-
pend on the agent’s epistemic position. If, on the one hand, determinism is true, the ob-
jective chance of an event is always going to be either 0 or 1. If, on the other hand, inde-
terminism is true, the objective chance of an event could be anywhere from 0 to 1. And it’s 
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and because, there is no set of attitudes that S is, as of t1, permitted to have at t2 that has any objective chance of resulting 
in S’s intentionally ϕ-ing at tn. 
3 See Bratman 1987 (p. 38), Harman 1976 (p. 432), Portmore 2011 (p. 174), Sobel 1994 (p. 239), Velleman 1989, and 
Wallace 2001 (p. 20). 
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the objective chance that matters, even if we’re interested in the agent’s subjective obliga-
tions.4 To see why, suppose that Kazumi, an officer in the LAPD Bomb Squad, has, as of t1, 
a subjective obligation to have the set of attitudes,  at t2, which includes both the desire 
to deactivate the bomb and the justified belief (justified by her training and experience) 
that cutting the red wire will deactivate it. And suppose that given some indeterminacy in 
the world Kazumi’s having  at t2 has a 10% (0.1) objective chance of resulting in Kazumi’s 
intentionally cutting the green wire at t3. In that case, I think that we must conclude that it 
is subjectively permissible for Kazumi to cut the green wire at t3. If it’s the indeterminacy 
in the world that leads to her intentionally cutting the green wire, then it’s the world, not 
her, that is to blame for her cutting the green wire.  
Third, the key question as far as attitudism is concerned is whether there is some set 
of attitudes that S is, as of t1, permitted to have at t2 that has some objective chance of re-
sulting in S’s intentionally ϕ-ing at tn. Thus, it is important to note that only a set of atti-
tudes that includes something such as an intention to ϕ could result in S’s intentionally ϕ-
ing. This is because what distinguishes a bodily movement that constitutes an intentional 
action (e.g., my foot rising as a result of my intention to kick a football) from an otherwise 
identical bodily movement that constitutes a mere happening (e.g., my foot rising as a re-
sult of a doctor’s striking my patellar ligament with her reflex hammer) is that the former, 
and not the latter, is appropriately (i.e., non-deviantly) caused by the relevant sort of men-
tal state (or states), such as the intention to perform the bodily movement in question.5 So 
suppose that I’m obligated to intend to remain perfectly still, and further suppose that this 
intention has a 100% objective chance of causing involuntary muscle contractions in my 
index finger, resulting in its twitching. It doesn’t follow, on attitudism, that I’m obligated 

4 If we’re interested in an account of S’s subjective obligations, then we need only insert the word ‘subjective’ before 
both ‘obligatory’ and ‘permitted’ in the above formulation of attitudism. If, instead, we’re interested in an account of S’s 
objective obligations, then we should instead insert the word ‘objective’ before both ‘obligatory’ and ‘permitted’. In 
either case, though, we leave the word ‘objective’ before ‘chance’.  
5 Besides the intention to ϕ, the relevant sorts of mental states may include a belief-desire pair (such as the desire for 
some end and the belief that that end would be achieved by one’s ϕ-ing) and, perhaps, even just a normative belief (such 
as the belief that one is obligated to ϕ). I want to allow, then, that there can be various sorts of mental states that both 
cause bodily movements (or movements of the mind) and are such that, when they do, the movements that they effect 
count as intentional actions. Nevertheless, I will often just talk about the intention to ϕ, using it as a kind of placeholder 
for any relevant sort of mental state. 
 6 
to twitch my index finger, for although the required intention has a 100% objective chance 
of resulting in the twitching of my index finger, it has a 0% objective chance of resulting in 
the intentional twitching of my index finger.  
Fourth, in the above formulation of attitudism, I index obligations to times. That is, I 
speak of an agent’s being obligated, as of a certain time, to ϕ. This is because an agent can 
be obligated, as of a certain time, to ϕ only if her ϕ-ing is, as of that time, an option for 
her. And since what was once an option for her may no longer be one, what was once re-
quired of her may no longer be required. To illustrate, imagine that, last week, Alejandra 
had the option of enlisting in either the Army or the Navy. But now that she has enlisted 
in the Army, she can’t enlist in the Navy, for this isn’t permitted. And if her options can 
change over time, then so too can her obligations. Suppose, for instance, that Alejandra 
had promised her father a month ago that she would enlist in the Navy on her birthday, 
which is today. A month ago, then, she had an obligation to enlist in the Navy on her 
birthday. But, as of yesterday, when she enlisted in the Army, she no longer has the option 
of enlisting in the Navy. Thus, she no longer has an obligation to do so. Of course, she 
may have an obligation to apologize to her father for breaking her promise. But she can-
not now be obligated to do what isn’t even an option for her. This means that, if we are to 
be careful, we must make explicit the relevant temporal indices when talking about op-
tions and obligations.  
Having clarified these matters, I can now go on to defend attitudism. My strategy will 
be to start by defending a rather weak claim about obligations with respect to attitudes 
and then defend ever-stronger claims until we arrive at attitudism. The progression of 
claims will go as follows: (C1) we have obligations with respect to attitudes; (C2) one such 
obligation is the obligation to refrain from having impermissible sets of attitudes; (C3) our 
obligation to refrain from performing impermissible acts derives from this more funda-
mental obligation to refrain from having impermissible sets of attitudes; and, more spe-
cifically, (C4) our ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, obligatory if and only if, and because, every set of 
attitudes that we are, as of t1, permitted to have at t2 has a 100% objective chance of result-
ing in our intentionally ϕ-ing at tn. 
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In sections 1–4, I defend each of these four claims in turn. In section 5, I defend two 
propositions about when we are permitted to have various attitudes. These propositions 
are then used to supplement attitudism so that it yields specific verdicts about what agents 
are obligated to do. And this enables me, in sections 6–8, to apply attitudism to three puz-
zling cases of rational choice, which in turn allows me to explore three important implica-
tions of attitudism. I then sum up my conclusions and discuss their importance in section 
9.  
 
1. Obligations with Respect to Attitudes 
It is at least prima facie plausible to suppose that we have obligations with respect to atti-
tudes. After all, we often claim that there are such obligations. Consider, for instance, 
claims i–vi with which I began this paper. Consider also that it seems quite natural to 
suppose that people are obligated to want what’s best for their children and to believe 
what they have conclusive evidence for believing. The only reason that some philosophers 
deny that we have such obligations is that they hold both that we do not have voluntary 
control over our attitudes and that we must have voluntary control over them in order to 
have obligations with respect to them.  
For a subject to have voluntary control over whether or not she ϕs is for her to have 
the same sort of control over whether or not she ϕs that I have over whether or not I, say, 
intentionally touch my nose. In other words, for a subject to have voluntary control over 
whether or not she ϕs is for her to have the capacity to form an effective intention to ϕ, 
one that would directly result in her intentionally ϕ-ing. And, clearly, we don’t generally 
have this sort of control over our attitudes.6 Whereas whether I will touch my nose just 
depends on whether I intend to do so, whether I will, say, form the belief that I have plen-
ty of milk in the fridge doesn’t. Of course, I may perform an act that then results in my 
forming this belief. I may, for instance, perform the act of opening the fridge and looking 
inside, and this act may result in my forming the belief that I have plenty of milk. But it is 
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6 My claim is only that believing, desiring, and intending are not things that we generally do at will. For all that I 
claim, then, it may be that pretending, imagining, supposing, and deciding are things that we do at will—see Clarke 
2008.  
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the act of opening the fridge, not the formation of the belief, that’s under my voluntary 
control. I form the belief that I have plenty of milk involuntarily in response to my per-
ception of a full gallon jug of milk in the fridge.  
Since we don’t seem to have voluntary control over our attitudes, some argue that we 
cannot have obligations with respect to them. The argument goes as follows:  
 
1. For any ϕ, S’s ϕ-ing is obligatory only if S can, in the relevant sense, ϕ, for ‘obligat-
ed to ϕ’ implies ‘can, in the relevant sense, ϕ’.  
2. For any ϕ, S can, in the relevant sense, ϕ only if S has voluntary control over 
whether or not she ϕs.  
3. For any attitude or set of attitudes ϕ, S does not have voluntary control over 
whether or not she ϕs.7 
4. Therefore, neither individual attitudes nor sets of attitudes can be obligatory. 
 
 The problem with this argument is that premise 2 is unmotivated. Of course, it would 
be perfectly appropriate to infer ‘S has voluntary control over her ϕ-ing’ from ‘S can, in 
the relevant sense, ϕ’ if we were to restrict the range of ‘ϕ’ to actions. But the appropriate-
ness of the inference when ‘ϕ’ is restricted to actions has nothing to do with ‘can’ and eve-
rything to do with the nature of actions.8 After all, what distinguishes an action from a 
mere happening is, as we noted above, that only the former is the type of event that was 
under the subject’s voluntary control. My foot rising as a result of my intention to kick a 
football is an action, whereas my foot rising as a result of a doctor’s striking my patellar 
ligament with her reflex hammer is a mere happening. And this is because the former, but 
not the latter, was under my voluntary control—that is, the former, but not the latter, was 
caused by my intending to kick. So if we restrict ‘ϕ’ to actions, then S will necessarily have 
voluntary control over her ϕ-ing simply because actions are events over which the subject 
has voluntary control. But this leaves it unclear as to why we should accept the inference 
from ‘S can, in the relevant sense, ϕ’ to ‘S has voluntary control over her ϕ-ing’ if ‘ϕ’ is not 
restricted to actions, which it isn’t in premise 2. And premise 2 needs to be well motivated 
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7 This is controversial, but I’ll grant it for the sake of argument.  
8 This idea is borrowed from Chuard and Southwood 2009. For other similar responses to this sort of argument, see 
Graham 2014 (p. 400, n. 22) and Hieronymi 2008. 
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given that it flies in the face commonsense, for we typically hold that agents are obligated 
to have certain attitudes (such as beliefs) and thus can, in the relevant sense, have these 
attitudes despite lacking voluntary control over them.  
 But maybe this has been too quick. Perhaps, premise 2 could be motivated by appeal 
to the notion of responsibility. The thought would be that S cannot be obligated to ϕ un-
less ϕ is the sort of thing for which she can be appropriately held responsible and that she 
cannot be appropriately held responsible for having ϕed unless she had voluntary control 
over whether or not she ϕed. But although it is plausible to assume that S must have had 
some sort of control over whether or not she ϕed for it to be appropriate to hold her re-
sponsible for having ϕed, I don’t see any reason for thinking that the relevant sort of con-
trol must be voluntary control. After all, we often hold people responsible for their beliefs, 
desires, and intentions, and this seems entirely appropriate despite the fact that these atti-
tudes are not under their voluntary control. As Scanlon notes, “Because ‘being responsi-
ble’ is mainly a matter of the appropriateness of demanding reasons, it is enough that the 
attitude in question be…one that either directly reflects the agent’s judgment or is sup-
posed to be governed by it. For this reason, one can be responsible not only for one’s ac-
tions but also for intentions, beliefs, and other attitudes” (Scanlon 1998, p. 22). Thus, the 
relevant sort of control seems to be rational control, where S has rational control over 
whether or not she ϕs if and only if whether or not she ϕs depends on whether or not she 
responds appropriately to the relevant reasons, assuming that she has the general capacity 
to do so.9 And, clearly, we have this sort of control over our attitudes. And since we have 
no reason to think that the relevant sense of ‘can’ necessitates voluntary control as op-
posed to rational control (at least in the case of attitudes), we should conclude the premise 
2 is unmotivated.  
 What’s worse is that premise 2 leads to a vicious regress. According to premise 2, S 
can, in the relevant sense, ϕ only if S has voluntary control over whether or not she ϕs. But 
what is it for S to have voluntary control over whether or not she ϕs? Clearly, one thing 
that’s necessary is that she can effectively intend to ϕ such that she would ϕ if she were to 

9 I borrow the general notion of rational control from A. M. Smith 2010, but this particular formulation of the notion 
is my own.  
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intend to ϕ. But just as clear is that this is not sufficient. For its being sufficient would im-
ply that unconscious people can do all sorts of things that they can’t do. After all, in the 
nearest possible world in which an unconscious, but otherwise able-bodied, patient in-
tends to raise her arms (a world in which she is conscious), she raises her arms. Thus, the 
counterfactual “the unconscious patient would raise her arms if she were to intend to do 
so” is true. So if this counterfactual’s being true were sufficient for such a patient to have 
voluntary control over whether or not she raises her arms, then we would have to accept 
the absurd conclusion that this patient can raise her arms despite being unconscious and 
unable to form the intention to do so. To avoid such absurd implications, the proponent 
of premise 2 must acknowledge that the truth of the counterfactual “S would ϕ if S were to 
intend to ϕ” is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for S’s having voluntary control 
over whether or not she ϕs and that, in addition this necessary condition, it must be that S 
can, in the relevant sense, form the intention to ϕ. Thus, even though the unconscious pa-
tient would raise her arms if she were to form the intention to do so, she cannot raise her 
arms, because she cannot, in the relevant sense, form this intention given that she is un-
conscious. Now, if we accept premise 2, we must hold that she can, in the relevant sense, 
form the intention to raise her arms only if whether or not she forms this intention is un-
der her voluntary control. And, as we’ve just discovered, for the formation of the intention 
to raise her arms to be under her voluntary control, it must be that she can, in the relevant 
sense, form the second-order intention to form the intention to raise her arms. And for 
the formation of this second-order intention to be under her voluntary control (as it must 
according to premise 2), it must be that she can, in the relevant sense, form the third-
order intention to form this second-order intention. And so and so forth, and, hence, an 
infinite regress ensues. 
Given that premise 2 is unmotivated and leads to a vicious regress, we should not be 
persuaded by the above argument to reject the view that there are obligations with respect 
to attitudes. So absent any other argument against this view (and I’m at a lost as to what it 
might be), we should take the view at face value. And, on its face, it (viz., C1) seems quite 
plausible.  
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2. An Obligation to Refrain from Forming an Impermissible Set of Attitudes 
Having established at least a presumption in favor of obligations with respect to attitudes, 
it should be unproblematic to add that one of these obligations is the obligation, as of t1, to 
refrain from having an impermissible set of attitudes at t2. This holds given that, by con-
ceptual necessity, it is obligatory to refrain from the impermissible. So if, as I’ve argued, 
there are obligations with respect to attitudes, then it follows that one of these obligations 
is the obligation to refrain from having an impermissible set of attitudes, which is just C2. 
 
3. Act-Obligations Derive from Attitude-Obligations 
Of course, attitudism goes beyond the claim that we have an obligation to refrain from 
having impermissible sets of attitudes; it makes the further claim (viz., C3) that our obli-
gation to refrain from performing impermissible acts derives from this more fundamental 
obligation. There are a couple of reasons for thinking this.  
First, consider that reasons-responsiveness is the ultimate source of our obligations. It 
is because we have the capacity to respond appropriately to reasons—a capacity that lower 
animals, young children, and the criminally insane typically lack—that we have obliga-
tions for which we can be appropriately held accountable. But it is our attitudes, not our 
actions, that are directly responsive to reasons. Indeed, our actions are reasons-responsive 
only insofar as the beliefs, desires, and intentions that issue in them are reasons-
responsive. For whether our attitudes issue in actions depends on things that are not at all 
responsive to reasons, such as the proper functioning of our nervous systems. A doctor 
may ask a patient with a possible spinal injury to wiggle her toes, and insofar as the pa-
tient is reasons-responsive she will form the intention to wiggle her toes. But whether this 
intention causes her toes to wiggle depends not at all on whether she is reasons-
responsive, but on whether she has the relevant sort of spinal injury. And if, as it turns 
out, she is unable to control the movement of her toes due to some spinal injury, we 
would deny that she has an obligation to wiggle her toes. At most, we would think that she 
has an obligation to intend to wiggle her toes. Since reasons-responsiveness is the source 
of our obligations and since it is the intention to ϕ, not the act of ϕ-ing, that is directly 
responsive to reasons, we should think that obligations with respect to ϕ-ing derive from 
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obligations with respect to intending to ϕ. If we are obligated to ϕ, it is only because we 
are obligated to intend to ϕ and the world is such that our intention will issue in our ϕ-
ing.  
Second, although it’s possible to have an obligation to intend to ϕ without having an 
obligation to intentionally ϕ, it’s impossible to have an obligation to intentionally ϕ with-
out having an obligation to intend to ϕ. The former is possible because intending to ϕ can 
be an option even when ϕ-ing is not, as is the case for the patient with the spinal injury 
who could intend to wiggle her toes but not wiggle them. The latter, by contrast, is impos-
sible, because, as a matter of conceptual necessity, one cannot intentionally ϕ without in-
tending to ϕ.10 Thus, intentionally ϕ-ing is logically and ontologically dependent upon in-
tending to ϕ. And this is important, because it seems that, in general, if we have obliga-
tions with respect to both X and Y, and X is logically and ontologically dependent on Y, 
then our obligations with respect to Y must be more fundamental than our obligations 
with respect to X. To illustrate, consider that knowing that p (that is, having an appropri-
ately justified true belief that p) is logically and ontologically dependent on believing that 
p. After all, it is logically impossible to know that p without believing that p. And because 
of this, it seems that the obligation to know that p must derive from a more fundamental 
obligation to believe that p, where p is both true and appropriately justified. Likewise, 
then, we should think that the obligation to intentionally ϕ derives from a more funda-
mental obligation to intend to ϕ, where ϕ is an act that one would perform if one were to 
intend to do so. Thus, it seems that our attitude-obligations (such as our obligation to in-
tend to ϕ) are more fundamental than our act-obligations (such as our obligation to in-
tentionally ϕ).  
For these two reasons, we should accept C3—that is, we should accept that our obli-
gation to refrain from performing impermissible acts derives from our more fundamental 
obligation to refrain from forming impermissible sets of attitudes. And having argued for 
C1–C3, I’ve laid the necessary groundwork for defending attitudism (or C4). That is, I’ve 
argued that we have obligations with respect to attitudes, that one of these obligations is 

10 Recall that I’m using ‘intend’ as a placeholder for any mental state that is such that, if it appropriately causes some 
bodily movement or movement of the mind, that movement counts as an intentional action. 
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the obligation to refrain from having impermissible sets of attitudes, and that our obliga-
tion to refrain from performing impermissible acts derives from this more fundamental 
obligation to refrain from having impermissible sets of attitudes. 
 
4. In Defense of Attitudism 
Since attitudism includes a bi-conditional, defending it requires defending the following 
two conditionals: (LEFT-RIGHT) if S’s ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, obligatory, then every set of atti-
tudes that S is, as of t1, permitted to have at t2 has a 100% objective chance of resulting in 
S’s intentionally ϕ-ing at tn and (RIGHT-LEFT) if every set of attitudes that S is, as of t1, per-
mitted to have at t2 has a 100% objective chance of resulting in S’s intentionally ϕ-ing at tn, 
then S’s ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, obligatory. Of course, attitudism also holds that the right 
side of the bi-conditional has explanatory priority, but I defended the idea that the deontic 
statuses of acts are to be explained in terms of the deontic statuses of attitudes when I de-
fended C3 above. So all that is left for me to defend is both LEFT-RIGHT and RIGHT-LEFT.  
According to LEFT-RIGHT, if an agent is obligated to ϕ, then there must be no chance 
that she would end up doing something else as a result of her having a permissible set of 
attitudes. Suppose for the sake of reductio, then, that there was some chance that she 
would end up doing something else as a result of her having a permissible set of attitudes. 
Suppose, for instance, she is permitted to intend to ψ and that this intention will result in 
her intentionally ψ-ing. How, then, could we hold her obligated to ϕ and criticize her for 
instead ψ-ing when she ψ-ed as a result of her permissibly intending to ψ? The answer is 
that we can’t, and, thus, we should accept LEFT-RIGHT.11  

11 There may seem to be an obvious counterexample to LEFT-RIGHT. Suppose that my pushing a button would cause 
ten people to die and have no good effects. Clearly, then, I have an obligation to not-push. But suppose that my evi-
dence misleadingly suggests that my pushing the button is necessary to save the ten. Consequently, I believe that I must 
push to save the ten. And since I desire to save the ten, I form the intention to push and so push. It may seem, then, that 
here is a case in which I’m obligated to not-push even though I’m led to push by the permissible set of attitudes just 
described. But we must be careful to distinguish my subjective obligations, which are a function of my perspective on 
the world, from my objective obligations, which are function of the way the world is and not of how I perceive it to be. 
So, in this case, I would say that, subjectively speaking, I ought to believe that I must push to save the ten, and so intend 
to push. But, subjectively speaking, I ought to push. So if we give LEFT-RIGHT a subjective gloss, then this is no counter-
example at all. For it is only, objectively speaking, that I ought to not-push. But if we’re going to go with an objective 
gloss of LEFT-RIGHT, then we should deny that you ought to believe that you must push to save the ten. Instead, you 
objectively ought to believe what’s true, which is that your pushing will kill the ten. And if you were to have this belief, 
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So there is a substantial cost to denying LEFT-RIGHT: doing so requires us to accept 
that someone can be blameworthy for having ψ-ed even though she was not blameworthy 
for having the attitudes that resulted in her intentionally ψ-ing. Even so, one could deny 
attitudism by instead denying RIGHT-LEFT. But, as we’ll see presently, this is not an attrac-
tive option either. According to RIGHT-LEFT, if having some permissible set of attitudes 
guarantees that one will ϕ so that the only way that one would not ϕ is by having some 
impermissible set of attitudes, then one is obligated to ϕ. For if the only way to see to it 
that one doesn’t ϕ is to have some impermissible set of attitudes, then one either ϕs or 
forms an impermissible set of attitudes. And since the latter is impermissible, it follows 
that ϕ-ing is the only permissible option. And to say that ϕ-ing is the only permissible op-
tion is just to say that ϕ-ing is obligatory. Thus, we should accept RIGHT-LEFT. 
So I’ve argued that we should accept each of attitudism’s components: LEFT-RIGHT, 
RIGHT-LEFT, and the explanatory priority of the right side of the bi-conditional. But an-
other reason to accept attitudism is, as we’ll see, that it has plausible implications in a vari-
ety of cases. But before we can explore its implications, we must first supplement it with 
some propositions about when it is permissible to have a set of attitudes, a task to which I 
now turn.  
 
5. Two Supplementary Propositions 
Recall that the view that I endorse is 
 
Attitudism: For any rational subject S, any act ϕ, any two consecutive times t1 and t2, 
and any later time tn (2 < n), S’s ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, obligatory if and only if, and be-
cause, every set of attitudes that S is, as of t1, permitted to have at t2 has a 100% objec-
tive chance of resulting in S’s intentionally ϕ-ing at tn. 
 
Obviously, this view cannot tell us whether S is obligated to ϕ at tn unless we have some 
way of determining whether or not S is permitted to have a given set of attitudes. We can, 
I believe, best determine this by appealing to the following account:  

you would form the intention to not-push and so not-push, which is exactly what you objectively ought to do. So re-
gardless of whether we give LEFT-RIGHT an objective gloss or a subjective gloss, this is no counterexample to it. 
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ATT  For any rational subject S, any set of attitudes , and any two consecutive 
times t1 and t2, S is permitted, as of t1, to have  at t2 if and only if 
(a) S has, as of t1, the option of having  at t2,  
(b) S has, as of t1, sufficient reason to have, at t2, each of the attitudes in , 
and 
(c) S’s having  at t2 wouldn’t violate any normative requirements.  
 
Although ATT is fairly straightforward, it does contain three clauses that need some 
explaining. First, there is clause a, whose purpose is to exclude the possibility that a sub-
ject could be required to come to have a set of attitudes that she couldn’t possibly form 
given that she is, say, unconscious, lacking the necessary conceptual apparatus, or subject 
to manipulation by a Frankfurtian demon who would prevent her from forming the rele-
vant attitudes if she were otherwise going to form them (Frankfurt 1969). Second, there is 
clause b, which should be uncontroversial, for, by definition, it is impermissible for S to ϕ 
if S lacks sufficient reason to ϕ. That the reasons for S to ϕ are insufficient to make S’s ϕ-
ing permissible is just what it means for S to lack sufficient reason to ϕ. And, lastly, there 
is clause c, whose purpose should be apparent given the point that I made in the opening 
part of this paper about the possibility of situations in which a subject has sufficient rea-
son to have each of two or more attitudes but is prohibited by some normative require-
ment from having them jointly.  
Merely adding ATT to attitudism isn’t enough to get us substantive verdicts about the 
permissibility of actions. For that, we would additionally need an account of when there is 
sufficient reason to have various types of attitudes as well as an account of the various 
normative requirements that govern these attitudes. And, unfortunately, doing all that is 
far beyond the scope of this paper. So when it comes to exploring the implications of atti-
tudism in the following section, I’ll need to tread carefully, picking only cases in which it 
is clear that the relevant sets of attitudes meet clauses a–c of ATT. Nevertheless, I will en-
deavor to provide an account of when there is sufficient reason to intend to perform an 
action. Actually, I’ll provide such an account for only a narrow range of cases, cases in 
which the only thing that is relevant to S’s decision of what to do at tn is how much utility 
her various alternatives might produce. I’ll call such cases utility cases.  
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The following account is, regretfully, rather complicated. So let me start off by ex-
plaining the motivation behind it. I’ll then try to explain the gist of the account before 
proceeding to state it in full. And, after stating it in full, I will, of course, explain the de-
tails. But let’s start with the motivation behind it.  
In utility cases, whether S should ϕ just depends on whether S’s ϕ-ing would maxim-
ize utility. But, interestingly, whether S’s ϕ-ing would maximize utility often depends on 
what background attitudes she has. (An attitude is a background attitude with respect to 
S’s ϕ-ing if and only if it is some attitude other than the intention of S to ϕ.) To illustrate, 
suppose that Professor Procrastinate has just received two emails requiring his immediate 
attention. One is from a journal, inviting him to write a book review.12 The other is from 
his department chair, asking him to commit to a topic for the seminar that he’ll be teach-
ing next semester. If he accepts the invitation while intending to respond to his chair with 
a commitment to make the book the topic of his seminar, then he will read the book and 
write the review. However, if he accepts the invitation while intending to respond to his 
chair with a commitment to teach a seminar on Kant (a topic over which he tends to ob-
sess), he will not read the book or write the review, but will instead obsess over how to 
interpret Kant. Thus, his accepting the invitation to write the book review will have good 
consequences if and only if he intends to respond to his department chair with a com-
mitment to teach his seminar on the book.  
To take one other example, suppose that Gopal has just been offered the chance to 
ride one of the Royal Lipizzaner Stallions. He is warned, though, that this horse can sense 
fear and will throw any rider who he senses to be fearful. Now, Gopal has no reason to 
fear the horse, but if he does, he should decline the offer, for it would be bad to get 
thrown. If, however, he rightly has no fear of the horse, then he should accept this rare 
opportunity to ride such a magnificent animal. So here too is a case where whether some-
one should ϕ (e.g., ride this horse) depends on what his or her background attitudes are 
(e.g., whether he fears this horse). 
As these examples illustrate, it is important to evaluate actions in the context of the 
agent’s background attitudes. This means that whether an agent has sufficient reason, say, 

12 This is a revised version of a case that I borrow from Jackson & Pargetter 1986. 
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to intend to accept an invitation to write a book review or to ride a certain horse depends 
on what her background attitudes are. And this need to accommodate the importance of 
considering S’s background attitudes when assessing whether she has sufficient reason to 
intend at t2 to ϕ at tn is the main motivation for the account given below.  
That’s the motivation, and the gist of the account is that, in utility cases (cases in 
which utility is the only salient feature), S has sufficient reason to intend at t2 to ϕ at tn if 
and only if there is some permissible set of background attitudes B1 such that the utility 
resulting from S’s having B1 at t2 and ϕ-ing at tn is at least as great as that resulting from 
any other combination of acts and permissible background attitudes. Thus, in the case of 
Gopal, he has sufficient reason to ride the horse, because there is some permissible set of 
background attitudes—specifically, the one in which he has no fear of the horse—such 
that the utility resulting from his having these background attitudes and riding the horse 
is at least as great as (indeed, greater than) that resulting from his having a permissible set 
of background attitudes and not riding the horse.  
That’s the gist. More formally, though, the account is as follows.  
 
INT   For any rational subject S in a utility case, any act ϕ, any two consecutive 
times t1 and t2, and any later time tn (2 < n), S has, as of t1, sufficient reason to 
intend at t2 to ϕ at tn if and only if, and because, there is some permissible set 
of background attitudes B1 such that (1) S would ϕ at tn if S were to intend at 
t2 to ϕ at tn while possessing B1 at t2 and (2) there is no alternative act ψ and 
permissible set of background attitudes B2—where B2 may or may not be 
identical to B1—such that (a) S would ψ at tn if S were to intend at t2 to ψ at tn 
while possessing B2 at t2 and (b) the prospect of S’s ψ-ing at tn in the context 
of having possessed B2 at t2 is better than the prospect of S’s ϕ-ing at tn in the 
context of having possessed B1 at t2.13 
  
There is much that needs to be explained here. First, we have conditions 1 and 2a, 
which hold S would ϕ/ψ at tn if S were to intend at t2 to ϕ/ψ at tn while possessing B1/B2 at 
t2. This is needed in order to avoid the possibility that agents could be required to form 

13 The prospect of S’s possessing B2 at t2 and ψ-ing at tn is better than the prospect of S’s possessing B1 at t2 and ϕ-ing at 
tn if and only if ∑i [Pr (oi /B2ψ) × U(oi)] is greater than ∑i [Pr (oi /B1ϕ) × U(oi)], where oi is a possible outcome resulting 
from S’s possessing B1 at t2 and χ-ing at tn, Pr (oi /B1χ) is the objective probability of oi resulting from S’s possessing B1 at 
t2 and χ-ing at tn, and U(oi) is the total utility in oi. 
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ineffective intentions. And, as we’ve seen from the case of Professor Procrastinate, wheth-
er an intention (such as the intention to write a book review) will be effective or not de-
pends on what one’s background attitudes are. If Professor Procrastinate intends to write 
the book review while having the background attitude of intending to commit to teaching 
a seminar on the book, then the intention to write the book review will be carried out. But 
if Professor Procrastinate intends to write the book review while having the background 
attitude of intending to commit to teaching a seminar on Kant, then the intention to write 
the book review will not be carried out.  
Second, I’ve restricted the relevant background attitudes to permissible ones. This is 
because the attitudes in question are ones that the agent can acquire only involuntarily in 
the response to reasons and/or normative requirements. Thus, it wouldn’t make sense to 
require agents to come to have attitudes that they weren’t permitted to have. For, in that 
case, they wouldn’t be able to acquire them involuntarily by responding appropriately to 
their reasons and/or normative requirements. Nor would they be able to acquire them 
voluntarily by intending to form them. For these attitudes, as discussed above, cannot be 
acquired voluntarily—at least, not typically. Thus, we should restrict the relevant back-
ground attitudes to those that are permissible. And this means, for instance, that we can 
require Professor Procrastinate to have the background attitude of intending to teach a 
seminar on the book, but not require Professor Procrastinate to have the background atti-
tude of believing (perhaps, due to wishful thinking) that writing the book review will land 
him the White’s Chair of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. Both of these two background atti-
tudes may be sufficient to render his intention to write the book review effective, but we 
cannot require Professor Procrastinate to have impermissible background attitudes such 
as the belief that writing a simple book review could somehow land him such a prestig-
ious position at Oxford.  
 Third, condition 2 is stated in terms of the prospect of S’s possessing Bi at t2 and χ-ing 
at tn as opposed to the consequences of S’s possessing Bi at t2 and χ-ing at tn, because there 
may be no determinate fact as to what the consequences would be. After all, indetermin-
ism may be true. And I talk about the prospect of S’s possessing Bi at t2 and χ-ing at tn as 
opposed to the prospect of S’s possessing Bi at t2 and intending to χ at tn (the relevant con-
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trast being between performing χ and intending to perform χ), because whether there is 
sufficient reason to intend to χ depends, not on the utility associated with S’s intending to 
χ, but on the utility associated with S’s χ-ing. The fact that I would receive a million dollars 
tomorrow morning if, at midnight tonight, I were to intend to drink some toxin tomor-
row afternoon doesn’t give me any reason to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon. Indeed, 
the fact that my drinking the toxin tomorrow afternoon would have no benefit (as my re-
ceiving the million dollars depends only on what I intend to do at midnight and not on 
whether I drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon) and would only make me terribly ill is a 
reason for me not to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon.14  
 The rest should be self-explanatory, although exactly how INT functions and why we 
should accept it may not be entirely clear until we have worked through a couple of exam-
ples. So, in the following three sections, I explore how the view that conjoins attitudism 
with both ATT and INT—which I’ll call conjunctive attitudism—applies in three cases. The-
se cases will illustrate some important implications of conjunctive attitudism.  
 
6. The Application and Implications of Conjunctive Attitudism: The Buttons 
The first case that I want to discuss is a modified version of a case that comes from Donald 
Regan’s excellent book Utilitarianism and Co-operation (1980). It’s an interesting case and 
is particularly important in motivating conjunctive attitudism, because it shows that an 
adequate practical theory will not be exclusively act-orientated but will instead be attitude-
dependent. To say that a theory is not exclusively act-orientated is to say that it requires 
something more of agents than just the performance of certain voluntary acts.15 For in-
stance, conjunctive attitudism is not exclusively act-orientated in that it requires agents to 
involuntarily form certain attitudes as well as to perform certain voluntary acts. And to 
say that a theory is attitude-dependent is to say that it takes what agents ought to do to be 
a function of what attitudes they ought to have. Conjunctive attitudism is attitude-

14 This case is borrowed from Kavka 1983. 
15 This is not Regan’s definition, for he provides no definition—see 1980, p. 109. But I believe that this definition cap-
tures (at least, roughly and sufficiently well for our purposes) the notion that he had in mind. 
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dependent in that it holds that what agents ought to do is a function of what they would 
do if they were to have the attitudes that they ought to have.  
I’ll call my modified version of Regan’s case The Buttons, because it involves two indi-
viduals, Coop and Uncoop, each with a button in front of them. Depending on whether 
each pushes his button at t4, the consequences will be as depicted in Table 1. Assume that 
the resulting utiles will be evenly distributed over all parties, including both Coop and 
Uncoop.  
  
Table 1  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Coop (the cooperative one) desires that they both push at t4. But, unfortunately, Un-
coop (the uncooperative one) lacks this desire. And Coop will push his button at t4 if and 
only if he finds at t3 that Uncoop desires that they both push. Let me just stipulate that 
they will each be able to read the other’s mind at t3 and thereby come to know what the 
other desires.16 So Uncoop will not push at t4, for he lacks the desire to push. And Coop 
will not push at t4 because he will read Uncoop’s mind at t3 and find that he lacks the de-
sire that they both push. So, neither Coop nor Uncoop is going to push at t4, but we can 
still ask of each of them: “Which act, push or not-push, is he (as of t1) required to perform 
at t4?”  
According to what I’ll call the standard view, the answer is surprisingly that each of 
them is (as of t1) required to not-push at t4, for the following is  
 
The Standard View: For any rational subject S in a utility case, any act ϕ, any time t1, 
and any later time tn (1 < n), S’s ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, obligatory if and only if, and be-
cause, there is no alternative act ψ such that the prospect of ψ-ing at tn is at least as 

16 If you don’t like fanciful examples involving mind readers, then just imagine that Coop and Uncoop are both pok-
er players, that Uncoop has an involuntary tell with respect to his desires (one that he cannot fake), and that Coop is 
able to read Uncoop’s tell.  
 The Buttons Uncoop: Push at t4 
Uncoop: 
Not-push at t4 
Coop:   Push at t4 100 utiles 0 utiles 
Coop:   Not-push at t4 0 utiles 60 utiles 
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good as the prospect of ϕ-ing at tn.17 
 
The standard view implies that Coop is (as of t1) required to not-push at t4, because, 
given that Uncoop is going to not-push at t4, the prospect of Coop’s pushing at t4 is 0 
utiles, whereas the prospect of Coop’s not-pushing at t4 is 60 utiles. (I’m assuming for the 
sake of simplifying the discussion that determinism is true and, thus, that all the relevant 
objective probabilities are either 0 or 1.) And the standard view also implies that Uncoop 
is (as of t1) required to not-push at t4. For given that Uncoop won’t desire at t3 that they 
both push, it follows that Coop isn’t going to push at t4. And given that Coop isn’t going to 
push at t4, the prospect of Uncoop’s pushing at t4 is 0 utiles, whereas the prospect of Un-
coop’s not-pushing at t4 is 60 utiles. So, according to the standard view, Coop and Uncoop 
are both required (as of t1) to not-push at t4.  
Note that it is because the standard view is exclusively act-orientated that it cannot 
require Uncoop to “do” all that is necessary to ensure the optimal outcome. To ensure the 
optimal outcome, Uncoop must do more than just perform the voluntary act of pushing. 
Uncoop must additionally form the desire that they both push, and forming this desire is 
not a voluntary act. Indeed, the only way that Uncoop can come to desire that they both 
push is by recognizing and responding appropriately to the decisive reason he has to form 
this desire—that reason being that their both pushing would produce the optimal out-
come. Thus, being exclusively act-oriented, the standard view is unable to require Uncoop 
to involuntarily form the desire that they both push. Of course, there may seem to be an 
easy and obvious fix: simply conjoin the standard view with ATT. Call this the conjunctive 
version of the standard view. But this won’t do, for although the conjunctive version of the 
standard view requires Uncoop to desire that they both push, it doesn’t require Uncoop to 
push. Given that Uncoop is not going to form the requisite desire, the conjunctive version 
of the standard view implies that Uncoop should not-push. But what we need is a theory 
that requires that Uncoop both desires at t3 that they both push and pushes at t4. For only 

17 The prospect of ψ-ing at tn is at least as good as the prospect of ϕ-ing at tn if and only if ∑i [Pr (oi /ψ) × U(oi)] is 
greater or equal to ∑i [Pr (oi /ϕ) × U(oi)], where oi is a possible outcome resulting from S’s χ-ing at tn, Pr (oi /χ) is the ob-
jective probability of oi resulting from S’s χ-ing at tn, and U(oi) is the total utility in oi. 
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a theory that requires both of Uncoop will require Uncoop to “do” all that is necessary to 
secure the optimal outcome. 
Nevertheless, as I will show presently, even this is not enough. That is, it isn’t enough 
for a theory to require Uncoop both to desire at t3 that they both push and to push at t4. 
An adequate practical theory must be attitude-dependent. That is, it must hold that what 
an agent ought to do depends on what attitudes she ought to have. To see why, consider 
the following view:  
 
The Cooperative View: For any rational subject S in a utility case, any act ϕ, any time 
t1, and any later time tn (1 < n), S’s ϕ-ing at tn is, as of t1, obligatory if and only if, and 
because, S’s ϕ-ing at tn is part of the best cooperative scheme.  
 
This view implies that Uncoop should push, for Uncoop’s pushing is part of the best 
cooperative scheme: the one in which Coop and Uncoop both push. So if we were conjoin 
the cooperative view with ATT (call this the conjunctive version of the cooperative view), 
we would end up with a theory that requires Uncoop both to desire at t3 that they both 
push and to push at t4. Thus, we would end up with a theory that requires Uncoop to “do” 
all that is necessary to secure the optimal outcome in The Buttons. However, this is not 
enough. For such a theory would have counterintuitive implications in the following vari-
ant on The Buttons. Call it The Frankfurtian Buttons. In this case, everything is as it was in 
The Buttons except that there is a Frankfurtian demon standing by to prevent Uncoop 
from forming the desire that they both push if he were otherwise going to form this de-
sire. Thus, in this case, condition a of ATT (which holds that Uncoop must have the option 
of forming the desire in order to be required to form it) is not met. So, in The Frankfurtian 
Buttons, Uncoop is not required to form the desire that they both push. Yet the conjunc-
tive version of the cooperative view still requires Uncoop to push, because his pushing is 
still part of the best cooperative scheme: the one in which he and Coop both push. But, 
given that Uncoop’s pushing without desiring that they both push would have terrible 
consequences, we should think that Uncoop is required to push only if Uncoop is also re-
quired to form the desire that they both push. The problem, then, with the conjunctive 
version of the cooperative view is that it requires Uncoop to push even if he is not re-
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quired to desire that they both push. What we need instead is an attitude-dependent view, 
a view that makes what Uncoop is required to do dependent on what attitudes he is re-
quired to have.   
So we’ve looked at four alternatives to conjunctive attitudism: (1) the standard view, 
(2) the cooperative view, (3) the conjunctive version of the standard view, and (4) the con-
junctive version of the cooperative view. The problem with first two is that they are exclu-
sively act-orientated and so can’t require Uncoop to desire that they both push. The prob-
lem with the conjunctive version of the standard view is that although it requires Uncoop 
to desire that they both push, it fails to require Uncoop to push. And the problem with the 
conjunctive version of the cooperative view is that it is not attitude-dependent and, thus, 
holds that Uncoop should push even if he is not required to desire that they both push. 
Conjunctive attitudism is superior to these four alternatives. First, not being exclu-
sively act-orientated, it requires Uncoop, in The Buttons, not only to push at t4 but also to 
desire at t3 that they both push. Second, being attitude-dependent, it requires Uncoop, in 
The Frankfurtian Buttons, to not-push at t4 given both that his desiring at t3 that they both 
push is not an option and that his not-pushing at t4 is the best that he can do if he lacks 
this desire. In both cases, then, conjunctive attitudism requires Uncoop to “do” all that is 
necessary to bring about the best outcome that he can. It’s just that whereas, in The But-
tons, that’s the outcome in which they both push, in The Frankfurtian Buttons, that’s the 
outcome in which they both not-push.  
Just so it’s clear, let me spell out how conjunctive attitudism gets these results. Let’s 
start with The Buttons. Given its commitment to ATT, conjunctive attitudism implies that 
Uncoop is, as of t1, required to desire at t3 that they both push. In this case, forming this 
desire is an option for Uncoop, and Uncoop has decisive reason to do so given that the 
object of this desire (i.e., their both pushing) has the best possible consequences. Fur-
thermore, given conjunctive attitudism’s commitment to INT, it implies that Uncoop is, as 
of t1, required to intend at t3 to push. For, according to INT, we are to determine whether 
Uncoop is, as of t1, required to intend at t3 to push or not-push by comparing the prospect 
of Uncoop’s both having the requisite desire at t3 and pushing at t4 to the prospect of Un-
coop’s both having the requisite desire at t3 and not-pushing at t4. And when we compare 
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these two, we find that the former has a value of 100 utiles, whereas the latter has a value 
of 0 utiles. After all, if Uncoop desires at t3 that they both push and pushes his button at t4, 
then Coop will also push at t4. And if they both push, 100 utiles will result. But if Uncoop 
desires at t3 that they both push but not-pushes at t4 (perhaps, despite desiring that they 
both push, Uncoop not-pushes because he is ordered to by his commanding officer), 0 
utiles will result. For if Uncoop desires at t3 that they both push, then Coop will push at t4. 
And if Coop pushes and Uncoop doesn’t, then 0 utiles will result. So conjunctive attitu-
dism entails that Uncoop is, as of t1, required not only to desire at t3 that they both push, 
but also to intend at t3 to push at t4. And this means that conjunctive attitudism entails 
that Uncoop is, as of t1, required to push at t4. For every set of attitudes that Uncoop is, as 
of t1, permitted to have at t3 has a 100% objective chance of leading to S’s intentionally 
pushing at t4. For, as we’ve seen, all the sets of attitudes that Uncoop is, as of t1, permitted 
to have at t3 include both the desire that they both push and the intention to push at t4. 
And I’m just assuming that the world is such that if, at t3, Uncoop both desires that they 
both push and intends to push at t4, this will result in his intentionally pushing at t4. Thus, 
conjunctive attitudism implies that Uncoop is, as of t1, required to push at t4.  
Now, let’s consider The Frankfurtian Buttons. In this case, ATT implies that Uncoop is 
not required to desire that they both push. Given the inclusion of clause a, ATT holds that 
an agent can be required to form a desire only if her forming the desire is an option for 
her. And, in The Frankfurtian Buttons, Uncoop’s forming the desire that they both push is 
not an option for him. And this means that, when we apply INT, we must compare the 
prospect of Uncoop’s both lacking the desire at t3 that they both push and pushing at t4 to 
the prospect of Uncoop’s both lacking the desire at t3 that they both push and not-pushing 
at t4. And when we compare these two, we find that the former has a value of 0 utiles, 
whereas the latter has a value of 60 utiles. After all, if Uncoop lacks the desire at t3 that 
they both push and pushes his button at t4, then Coop will not-push and he will push, re-
sulting in 0 utiles. But if Uncoop lacks the desire at t3 that they both push but not-pushes at 
t4, then 60 utiles will result. So conjunctive attitudism entails that Uncoop is, as of t1, re-
quired to intend at t3 to not-push at t4. And the world is, I’ll assume, such that if, at t3, Un-
coop both lacks the desire that they both push and intends at t3 to not-push at t4, then this 
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will result in his not-pushing at t4. So conjunctive attitudism implies that, in The Frankfur-
tian Buttons, Uncoop is, as of t1, required to not-push at t4. 
It seems to me, then, that conjunctive attitudism gets the intuitively right results in 
both The Buttons and The Frankfurtian Buttons. Yet some may question the plausibility of 
conjunctive attitudism’s implications in The Buttons once they realize that it implies not 
only that Uncoop is, as of t1, required to push at t4 but also that Coop is, as of t1, required 
to not-push at t4. For Coop should intend to not-push given that Uncoop is going to not-
push, and I’m assuming that the world is such that if Coop intends to not-push he will 
not-push. But it may seem absurd for conjunctive attitudism to hold both that Uncoop 
should push and that Coop should not-push given that the worse possible outcome (the 
one with 0 utiles) will obtain if Uncoop pushes and Coop not-pushes. Contrary to how 
things may seem, though, this is not absurd, for Uncoop and Coop are in very different 
situations. Uncoop is in a position to affect what Coop does, whereas Coop is not in a po-
sition to affect what Uncoop does. If Uncoop desires at t3 that they both push, then Coop 
will push. And this is why Uncoop is required both to have this desire and to push. How-
ever, Uncoop is going to not-push regardless what Coop does or desires. And this is why 
Coop must just take for granted that Uncoop will not-push and make the best of a bad 
situation by not-pushing as well.18  
Of course, some people could, despite all these arguments, maintain that Uncoop 
should not-push given that Coop is going to not-push, and they may even acknowledge 
that Coop’s not-pushing is contingent upon Uncoop’s failing to fulfill his obligation to de-
sire that they both push.19 But if they do, they should also acknowledge that their position 
implies that Uncoop faces a normative dilemma for which there is no way out. For if Un-

18 If you still have any doubts, then just imagine the following variation of The Buttons: Buttons 2. This case is exactly 
like The Buttons except that in this case whether Coop will push depends, not on whether Uncoop desires that they both 
push, but on whether Uncoop tells Coop that he’s willing to push. And in Buttons 2 Uncoop is not going to tell Coop 
that he’s willing to push. In this case, it seems that Uncoop should push for he should both tell Coop at t3 that he’s will-
ing to push and push at t4. But Coop should not push, for Uncoop is not going to push and nothing he can do will 
change that.  
19 Also, those who hold that Uncoop should not-push will have to deny the validity of deontic detachment, which 
holds that, from O(p) and O(p → q), O(q) follows, where ‘O(x)’ stands for ‘it ought to be that x’ (Greenspan 1975). After 
all, it ought to be that Uncoop desires that they both push, and it ought to be that, if Uncoop desires that they both 
push, he pushes. So, from deontic detachment, it follows that it ought to be that Uncoop pushes. 
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coop has the set of the attitudes that he ought to have (the set that includes both a desire 
that they both push and an intention to push), he will push. And yet these same people 
maintain that Uncoop should not-push. To my mind, this is too great a cost. We should 
not accept that normative dilemmas (for which there is no way out) can arise without 
their having been some past mistake—that is, some previous normative failure. And, in 
this case, there needn’t have been any past mistake. For we can just stipulate that Coop 
and Uncoop arose ex nihilo with all and only the attitudes and dispositions that they are 
stipulated to have. Thus, it needn’t be that Uncoop made any previous mistake that result-
ed in his lacking the desire that they both push. Still, it would be a future mistake for Un-
coop to fail to form the desire that they both push in the face of his current awareness of 
decisive reasons for forming this desire.   
To sum up, I’ve argued that we should accept both that, in The Buttons, Uncoop is, as 
of t1, required to push at t4 and that, in The Frankfurtian Buttons, Uncoop is, as of t1, re-
quired to not-push at t4. The only kind of practical theory that can get these two intuitive 
verdicts is one that, like conjunctive attitudism, is not exclusively act-orientated but is in-
stead attitude-dependent. This, I believe, constitutes good evidence in favor of conjunctive 
attitudism and against views like the standard view and the cooperative view. In the next 
two sections, I’ll buttress the case in favor of conjunctive attitudism by showing that it gets 
intuitive verdicts in yet more cases.   
 
7. The Application and Implications of Conjunctive Attitudism: The Cookies 
Besides implying that an adequate practical theory must not be exclusively act-orientated 
and should instead be attitude dependent, attitudism implies that an agent can be obligat-
ed to perform only those acts that she has some chance of performing given a permissible 
set of attitudes. And this, in turn, has important implications for a key debate among 
practical theorists. The debate concerns following sort of case.  
 
The Cookies: If I were to eat a cookie now, I would then eat another, and another, and 
so on until I’ve finished the whole bag, ending up sick to my stomach. But let’s also 
suppose that if, after eating just one cookie, I decided to stop and put the bag of cook-
ies away, I would then stop after having eaten just one cookie, which would be best. 
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Second best would be my eating no cookies. (And assume that if I were refrain from 
eating a cookie now, I would end up eating no cookies.) Third best would be my eat-
ing two cookies. Fourth best would be my eating three cookies, and so on and so 
forth. Worst of all would be my eating the whole bag. The problem is that although I 
would stop eating after having eaten just one cookie if I were at that point to decide to 
stop eating and put the bag away, I am in fact going to decide to continue eating after 
tasting how delicious they are, and this is true no matter what I intend, want, think, 
or feel now (before eating a cookie and finding out how delicious they are). And this 
is unfortunate, because this decision will lead to my eating the whole bag, which is 
the worst possible outcome. 
 
On the one hand, some (e.g., Goldman 1978 and Portmore 2011) argue that my eating 
just one cookie is not an option for me at present given that no matter what I want, in-
tend, think, or feel now I will not eat just one cookie. These people hold that I should re-
frain from eating any cookies, as this is better than my only other option, which, on this 
view, is my eating the whole bag. On the other hand, others (e.g., Feldman 1986 and 
Zimmerman 1996) argue that because I would stop after having eaten just one cookie if I 
were then to decide to stop and put the bag away, I currently have the option of eating just 
one cookie. These people, known as possibilists, hold that I should eat just one cookie and 
then put the bag away, for this is the best of what they take my options to be. But if attitu-
dism is correct, then possibilists have a mistaken account of what an agent’s options and 
obligations are. I can’t now be obligated to eat just one cookie if there is no permissible set 
of attitudes such that, if I were to have those attitudes, I would then eat just one cookie. So 
if attitudism is true, then possibilism is false. 
Interestingly, if conjunctive attitudism is true, then the leading contender to possibil-
ism—namely, actualism—is also false. Actualism is just the view that I’ve been calling the 
standard view. And, on the standard view, you should eat a cookie and then put the bag 
away. For the prospect of your doing this is better than that of either eating no cookies or 
eating more than one cookie. Nevertheless, the standard view also implies that you should 
not eat a cookie. For the prospect of your eating a cookie (i.e., the outcome in which you 
end up eating the whole bag) is worse than the prospect of your not eating a cookie (i.e., 
the outcome in which you end up having eaten no cookies). So the standard view leaves 
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you with no way out. If you eat a cookie, you will have violated the requirement not to eat 
a cookie. But if you don’t eat a cookie, you will have violated the requirement to eat a 
cookie and then put the bag away. Conjunctive attitudism, by contrast, avoids such in-
compatible obligations, for although it agrees with the standard view that you should not 
eat a cookie, it denies that you should eat a cookie and then put the bag away, for, on con-
junctive attitudism, this isn’t even an option. After all, it’s stipulated that no matter what 
your attitudes are now, you will not eat a cookie and then put the bag away.  
 
8. The Application and Implications of Conjunctive Attitudism: The Pies 
Limiting our options in this way also helps us deal with the following sort of case.  
 
The Pies: You start off at t0 with an apple pie (AP) and $1. At t1, I offer you a blueberry 
pie (BP) in exchange for your apple pie plus 10¢. If you take this deal (call it Deal1) at 
t2, I’ll next offer you at t3 a cherry pie (CP) in exchange for your blueberry pie plus 
10¢. If you take this deal (call it Deal2) at t4, I’ll offer at t5 to give back the apple pie 
with which you started in exchange for your cherry pie plus 10¢. And if you take this 
deal (call it Deal3) at t6, you’ll end up at t7 with the same apple pie with which you 
started, only 30¢ poorer. If you don’t take a given deal, you won’t be offered any sub-
sequent deals.  
Unfortunately, you have the following cyclical and, thus, intransitive preferences: 
 
{AP, $1}  {BP, 90¢}  {CP, 80¢}  {AP, 70¢}  {AP, $1}  {CP, 80¢} 
 
Here, ‘A  B’ stands for ‘you prefer B to A’ and ‘{x, y}’ stands for ‘the state of affairs in 
which you have both x and y’.  
Given these preferences, you are inclined at t1 to take Deal1 at t2. But, if you take 
Deal1 at t2, you will subsequently take both Deal2 at t4 and Deal3 at t6. Even if you were 
to intend at t1 to take only the first two deals, you would at t5 change your mind and 
decide to take Deal3 at t6, ending up, then, with the same apple pie with which you 
started, only 30¢ poorer. Indeed, the only way to ensure that you won’t later change 
your mind is to impermissibly form at t1 the intention to kill whoever has the apple 
pie at t7, whether that be me or you. So if you take Deal1 at t2 (assuming that you don’t 
intend to kill whoever has the apple pie at t7), you’ll end up with {AP, 70¢}. And if you 
refuse Deal1 at t2, you’ll end up with {AP, $1}.20   

20 This is adapted from a similar case found in Hedden 2013. 
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 Many would argue that such cyclical and intransitive preferences are irrational. Some 
argue this, because cyclical preferences can, as this example illustrates, turn you into a 
money pump. Others argue this, because they think that our preferences should track the 
betterness relation, which they claim is transitive. If cyclical preferences are indeed irra-
tional, then it’s fortunate that conjunctive attitudism is not exclusively act-orientated and 
can, therefore, require you to revise your preferences. Suppose, then, that if you were to 
revise your preferences so as to make them rational, you would come to have the follow-
ing transitive preferences: 
 
{AP, 70¢}  {AP, $1}  {BP, 90¢}  {CP, 80¢}  {AP, 70¢} 
 
In this case, you don’t have to worry about ending up with {AP, 70¢}. Since you prefer 
{CP, 80¢} to {AP, 70¢}, you won’t be tempted to take Deal3. So, in this case, if you take 
Deal1 at t2, you’ll end up with {CP, 80¢}, which is your most preferred state of affairs. And 
if you refuse Deal1 at t2, you’ll end up with {AP, $1}, which you disprefer to {CP, 80¢}. 
Thus, conjunctive attitudism implies that you should, in this case, revise your preferences 
and intend to take Deal1 at t2.21 And since, as we’ll assume, you would take Deal1 at t2 if this 
were your intention, then it follows, on conjunctive attitudism, that you should take Deal1 
at t2.  
But what if your cyclical preferences are rational?22 In that case, conjunctive attitu-
dism holds that you should refuse Deal1 at t2. For if your cyclical preferences are rational, 
then we can’t require you to revise them. And given such cyclical preferences, you will be 
sorely tempted to take each subsequent deal if you take the first one.23 Indeed, it is stipu-

21 I’m assuming that this is a utility case and that your utility function is just your preference function.  
22 See, for instance, Quinn 1990. And see both Andreou 2007 and Hedden 2013 for why we shouldn’t think that the 
fact that cyclical preferences can turn us into money pumps is a good reason to think that cyclical preferences are irra-
tional. Hedden thinks, though, that there may be better reasons for thinking that cyclical preferences are irrational. For 
instance, he mentions (p. 26, n. 43) that one might appeal to the transitivity of betterness and argue for a link between 
rational preferences and betterness. But, of course, we could, as Temkin and Rachels do, argue that betterness is not 
transitive and then cite the link between rational preferences and betterness as a reason to think that rational prefer-
ences needn’t be transitive. See, for instance, Rachels 1998 and Temkin 1996. 
23 If you were instead a very resolute sort of person who could resist future temptation and so effectively intend at t0 
to end up at any one of the four possible states (that is, {AP, $1}, {BP, 90¢}, {CP, 80¢}, and {AP, 70¢}), then conjunctive 
attitudism would imply that you face a rational dilemma, where no matter which state you choose to end up in, you will 
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lated that if you were to take Deal1 at t2, you would then take the next two deals and end 
up with {AP, 70¢}, whereas, if you were to refuse Deal1 at t2, you would end up with {AP, 
$1}, which you prefer to {AP, 70¢}. Given that the prospect of your refusing Deal1 at t2 
(viz., {AP, $1}) is better than the prospect of your taking Deal1 at t2 (viz., {AP, 70¢}), con-
junctive attitudism implies that you are required to intend to refuse Deal1 at t2. And given 
that you will, or so I’ll assume, refuse Deal1 at t2 if that’s what you intend, it follows that, 
on conjunctive attitudism, you are required to refuse Deal1 at t2.  
You may wonder, though, why intending to refuse Deal1 at t2 wouldn’t be prohibited 
given that there is an alternative—viz., the series of acts consisting in your taking both 
Deal1 at t2 and Deal2 at t4 but refusing Deal3 at t6—whose prospect (i.e., {CP, 80¢}) is pre-
ferred to the prospect of your refusing Deal1 at t2 (i.e., {AP, $1}). The answer lies with the 
fact that on conjunctive attitudism you can be required to perform only those acts that 
have some chance of being performed if you were to have some permissible set of atti-
tudes. And, as stipulated in this example, there is no chance that you will take only the 
first two deals if you permissibly refrain from intending to kill whoever has the apple pie 
at t7. 
So conjunctive attitudism is an attractive position with respect to The Pies. It’s neutral 
on whether your cyclical preferences are irrational. But if they are irrational, then, unlike 
views that are exclusively act-orientated, it requires you both to change your preferences 
and to perform the act that you would perform were you to have the attitudes that you 
ought to have—viz., the act of taking Deal1 at t2. And if your cyclical preferences are ra-
tional, then it holds that you are, as of t0, required not only (1) to refrain from forming at t1 
the intention to kill whoever has the apple pie at t7, but also (2) to refuse Deal1 at t2. Thus, 
being attitude-dependent, conjunctive attitudism plausibly implies that whether you 
should take or refuse Deal1 at t2 depends on whether or not you should revise your prefer-
ences. If you should revise your preferences such that you won’t be tempted at t5 to take 

have chosen wrongly, because there was an alternative state that you could have ended up in that is preferred to the one 
that you chose. This, I think, is as it should be. This case would then be like the case in which God will give you negative 
utility if you pick no positive integer and will give you a corresponding amount of positive utility if you pick some posi-
tive integer. No matter which positive integer, n, you pick, you will have picked wrongly, because it would have been 
better had you picked n+1.    
 31 
Deal3 at t6 after you’ve taken both Deal1 at t2 and Deal2 at t4, then you should, as of t0, take 
Deal1 at t2. But if you are permitted to keep your cyclical preferences, then you should, as 
of t0, refuse Deal1 at t2. For, given those preferences, taking Deal1 at t2 would just result in 
your ending up with the same apple pie with which you started, only 30¢ poorer.  
  
9. Conclusion 
I’ve argued for a radically different sort of practical theory, a theory that is not exclusively 
act-orientated but is instead attitude-dependent. According to such a view, we cannot un-
derstand what our practical obligations are merely by considering which acts we could 
perform and what features they have. We must also consider which attitudes we should 
have and which actions we would perform if we were to have these attitudes. This means 
that most typical practical theories are mistaken. Theories such as rational egoism, Ros-
sian deontology, act-consequentialism, and rule-consequentialism are mistaken because 
they are exclusively act-orientated and, thus, unable to require Uncoop to have the atti-
tudes that he is required to have—the attitudes that he must have in order to secure the 
optimal outcome. And theories such as global consequentialism and virtue ethics are mis-
taken, for even though they are not exclusively act-orientated, they fail to be attitude-
dependent and thus fail to make what Uncoop should do dependent on what attitudes he 
ought to have. So one important implication of this paper is that most, if not all, of the 
theories currently on offer are inadequate and that we should, therefore, turn our atten-
tion to developing a theory such as conjunctive attitudism that meets both the constraint 
of not being exclusively act-orientated and the constraint of being attitude dependent.  
The only two theories that I know of that are not ruled out by these two constraints 
are Regan’s (1980) cooperative utilitarianism and Adams’s (1976) conscience utilitarian-
ism. Cooperative utilitarianism is untenable for reasons that I spell out in Portmore 2014. 
And conscience utilitarianism is, I believe, also untenable. Conscience utilitarianism holds 
both that (1) “we have a moral duty to do an act, if and only if it would be demanded of us 
by the most useful kind of conscience we could have” (p. 479) and that (2) we have a mor-
al duty to have the most useful kind of conscience we could have. Note that, by ‘most use-
ful’, Adams means ‘most productive of utility’. One reason to think that conscience utili-
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tarianism is untenable is that it morally requires agents to have attitudes that they are not 
even rationally permitted to have. For instance, if the belief that God punishes immoral 
agents with eternal damnation would be part of the most useful kind of conscience that I 
could have (because, say, it would motivate me to act morally), then conscience utilitari-
anism requires me to have this belief even if it’s false and even if I have no evidence for it. 
To take just one other example, if a surgeon’s non-instrumental desire for the death of her 
patient would be part of the most useful kind of conscience that she could have (because, 
say, it would result in her killing her patient and thereby making her donor organs availa-
ble for saving the greater number), then conscience utilitarianism requires her to non-
instrumentally desire the death of her patient even though the patient’s death is only in-
strumentally valuable. 
In any case, I’ve shown more than just that conjunctive attitudism can meet the above 
two constraints. I’ve also shown that it gets intuitively plausible verdicts in a range of oth-
erwise puzzling cases, such as The Buttons, The Cookies, and The Pies. Lastly, I’ve shown 
that conjunctive attitudism has important implications with respect to what counts as an 
option for an agent and, consequently, offers a way of resolving the debate between actual-
ists and possibilists.24  
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